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After the fall of Ben Ali’s regime, fears were growing as various religious parties 
have decided to run in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of October 23
th
, 2011.  The 
Code of Personal Status, the very symbol of Bourguibian modernity, might well be 
challenged. Beyond their presence on traditional media, feminist movements have organised 
themselves online so as to make themselves heard and to be able to mobilize public opinion. 
Facebook has become a place that maximizes visibility, thus allowing Tunisian feminists to 
make their ideas and their actions widely known. By favouring distanciated commitment, 
Facebook is a tool that has brought about an upheaval in the various forms of militancy and 
the militant’s relationships to organizational structures. 
 




Tunisian women’s trailblazing and advantageous legal status is considered an 
exception in Muslim countries.  For decades the status has been a showcase for successive 
Tunisian governments, a forceful argument at election time for President Ben Ali, and an 
often-used alibi by the authorities when European countries and NGOs challenge the regime 
about human rights and freedom of the press. We will first show the specificity of the status, 
then we will have a close look at the role played by social media in the defense of the status 
as Tunisia is going through a period of political turmoil. In this part we will also show that 
the defense of women’s freedom has brought about new ways of using social networks and 
that those new forms of mobilization online have now appeared. 
 
Legal Specificities for an Outstanding Status 
The much-vaunted Tunisian Personal Status Code (PSC) is the result of a long 
process that spread over a century.  First reformers’ reflections, the national debate of the 
1930s over women’s liberation and finally Habib Bourguiba’s highly symbolic strategic 
choices all combined to make the Code possible. In the following part, we will present the 
contribution of Tunisian first reformers and thinkers before explaining the context in which a 
national debate was made possible after Tahar Haddad’s Our Women in the Sharia'a and 
Society was published in 1929. We will conclude this part with the political decisions and 
strategic choices made by both Tunisian presidents between 1956 and 2011. 
 
The Historical and Intellectual Foundations of the Tunisian Specificity 
The women’s issue arose in Tunisia and was the result of Turkish and Egyptian 
experiences that had been taking previous Tunisian experiences into account. They were all 
based, on the one hand, on the ideas of an elite whose members, for most of them, had 
studied at al-Zitouna University and raised on the concepts elaborated by Middle-Eastern 
reformers (Rifât Tahtawi, Mohammed Abduh, Rachid Ridha). On the other hand, they were 
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also based on the ideas of intellectuals who had been educated at Sadiki College and then in 
French universities. Middle-Eastern reformers and Tunisian thinkers have indeed compared 
French women life to those of their citizens during their stay in France. Thus the have noted 
the importance of women's education and social integration. This comparison allowed them 
to propose solutions to what was called the decadence of Arab societies in political, social 
and economic sectors. 
There was also the considerable contribution of 19
th
 century Tunisian thinkers who all 
helped to lay the bases of modernism.  Among the first reformers was Private secretary 
Ahmed Bin Dhiaf who was the first person to talk about women’s emancipation and to stress 
the need to give both professional and religious education. Kheireddine Pacha, for instance 
forcefully asked in 1877 for a new status for women while emphasizing the need for girls to 
go to school and get educated. He relentlessly argued against the fears raised by ulemas about 
women’s emancipation. That question became extremely controversial after Tahar Haddar’s 
book Our Women in the Charia'a and Society was published in 1929. Indeed it generated 
unanimous reprobation that escalated into unprecedented violence.  
In that reference book, Haddad denounced the enslavement of women, dealt with 
social and legal aspects of the Women’s issue, compared the lot of Arab women to that of 
European women and severely criticized the lack of education for girls. More clairvoyant 
than his predecessors, he regretted that nothing was done to educate women and girls about 
conjugal relationships and to tell how to deal with their emotions. He compared the veil to a 
muzzle and listed its negative consequences on girls’/women’s lives (submission, 
confinement) and on their married lives (separation of the sexes, dependence on a husband 
and inability to educate her children). He also denounced parents’ interventions in the choice 
of a husband, enforced marriages and weddings of under-age girls to much older men. 
Polygamy and repudiation were also condemned. Besides Haddad demanded special law 
courts for divorces. 
 Even though he underlined that his work was based on a reinterpretation of the Quran 
and the founding texts, he was quickly accused of atheism and of being submissive to 
Western values (thinking, clothing style, emancipation). Charged with atheism and 
blasphemy, he lost his jobs as a professor and a notary and his book was banned. An 
unprecedented smear campaign was launched in the columns of Azzohra, An-nadim and An-
anhdha.  
The controversy that followed the publication of the book was the first real violent 
form of expression against any movement of women’s liberation in Tunisia. It was also the 
first debate of that magnitude, hence its importance in the construction of public space in 
Tunisia.  
While intellectuals were debating some Muslim Tunisian women, belonging for most 
of them to the Tunis bourgeoisie, started to claim the right to be emancipated, not to wear the 
veil, the right to be educated and the right to work. Manoubia Ouertani is a case in point: on 
January 24
th
 1924, she took off her veil during a lecture on feminism (“For or against 
feminism”). Despite reprobation and violent reactions Habiba Menchari too took off her veil 
before a conference she was giving on Janury 8, 1929 and which was entitled “Tomorrow’s 
Arab women, for or against the veil”.  It drew strong condemnation from the National 
Movement, theologians as well from colonial authorities. Thus a long and meaningful debate 
started that mainly appeared in newspapers ad periodicals.  It paved the way to reforms that 
take place after the independence of the country and that will be presented in the next part. 
 
 Promulgation of the Personal Status Code and the societal revolution 
Habib Bourguiba became the first president of the Tunisian Republic after Tunisia 
became independent. The new president was deeply influenced by 19
th
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thinkers and imbued by Hadda’s ideas. So much so, those women were at the centre of his 
agenda when he started reshaping the country. On August 13
th
, 1956 he promulgated the 
Personal Status Code (PSC) before monarchy was abolished and the Republic proclaimed 
and three years before the constitution was adopted on June 1
st
 1959. That shows how 
important women’s emancipation was to him. The same day (August 13th 1956), Women’s 
day was proclaimed, twenty years before the UN proclaimed March 8
th
 the UN day for 
women’s rights and international peace.  The outstanding measures included in the PSC made 
it really outstanding in an Arab Muslim country. Indeed, polygamy was banned (Art.18), 
unilateral repudiation by the husband is abolished and is replaced by a divorce procedure 
(Art. 30); the divorce procedure can be requested by man and wife alike (Art. 31).  A 
marriage can only be concluded with the consent of both spouses, in other words the status of 
matrimonial guardian who could speak in the name of the bride was abolished (Art. 3), and 
so was abolished the father’s or guardian’s constraining power over a woman’s marriage (the 
jabr/jerb). Women were allowed to work, to teach, to vote and the civil rights they were 
granted were really impressive compared to other Arab countries. 
The promulgation of the Code was a watershed in the history of the country. It was 
also a big step towards the reinterpretation of the Quran.  The stand taken by Tunisian women 
is both original and exceptional because it did overstep Islam rules set up by retrograde 
religious authorities. There was no violent rejection of the code by the people in Tunisia; on 
the other hand, ulemas and conservatives were quick to react as can be seen in the national 
newspapers of the time. Abroad, Arab chiefs of state and Muslims expressed their indignation 
and populations their refusal of such measures that they considered as “illegal”. Knowing full 
well that he had provoked traditionalists and theologians alike, Bourguiba justified the PSC 
by referring to religion. He declared in 1956 “We have achieved a rational enterprise founded 
on the very principles of Islam”. He did hesitate to show himself with theologians he said he 
had consulted prior to and during the drafting of the Code. There was no breaking away from 
religion but with Arab and Muslim traditions. Just like Haddad did in his time, Bourguiba 
based his action on a reinterpretation of sacred texts. It was a way for him to justify himself, 
to confer legitimacy on his choices, and, above all, to gain religious legitimacy so that the 
population could agree to his project. For Bourguiba, this was a major political coup. It was 
also highly symbolic. He also put his communication skills to full use. He made countless 
public speeches, launched a frontal against the veil and he even tried to take an Haik (image 1 
- 1957) and a veil (image 2 – 1960) off the heads of two women. The gradual acceptance of 
women’s rights is mainly due to Bourguiba’s charisma. In other words, people accepted 




Image 1 Image 2 
 
Bourguiba’s reforms shook the very foundations of religion and traditions. With his 
attack on the veil, he was taking on Tunisian Imams and theologians, as the veil was one of 
the pillars of institutional Islam in the country. Despite the risks he was running, he deemed it 
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law and traditions that were plaguing society.  
Besides the unveiling and a better social and legal status for women, Bourguiba 
initiated the family planning revolution in 1964.  
Import and sales of contraceptives were allowed (law of January 9
th
, 1961). In 1965 a 
bill was passed allowing “social abortion” in the first three months of pregnancy for the fifth 
child. A decisive step was taken on September 26
th
, 1973 when abortion was made legal 
whereas it was not allowed in Islam, whatever the number of children.  Bourguiba used the 
same tactics as with PSC: he associated much respected religious leaders so as to lend 
undisputed legitimacy to his project. Bourguiba’s revolutionary reforms enabled women to 
have a special place in civil space and on the labour market.  
 
The Ben Ali period: Respect for Bourguiba’s Legacy and Consolidation 
Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali took power on November 7
th 
1987, after he had deposed 
President Bourguiba. He was in power untill January 14
th
, 2011. In the national covenant of 
1988, a founding document of the new regime that came after a period of uncertainty, the 
PCS was presented as a national asset and thus could not be negotiated. The national 
covenant stipulates that “the PCS reforms aim at liberating and emancipating women; they 
are in accordance with a very old aspiration that existed in our country. The reforms are 
based on Ijtihad (exegesis) and on the goals of the sharia’a. They show the validity of Islam 
and of its opening to the demands and the evolution of the modern world”.3 
Ben Ali revived Bourguiba’s policy for women. In 1956, the latter needed women to 
establish his authority and to affirm his modernist stand; in 1988 Ben Ali needed women to 
fight Islamism. “Women are thus the counterparts of Islamists who fight them. Once again, 
they are at the centre of a societal struggle. They are the only ones that can’t be suspected by 
those in power either of supporting or of allying with Ennahda” (Daoud 1990, 101). 
Ben Ali then took several measures to consolidate women’s rights. The 8/13/1992 
amendments comforted and reassured women. They mainly consisted in: 
 
- The creation of a fund guaranteeing alimony payments for divorced wives and her 
children in case the divorced husband sought to shirked his responsibility (absence, 
escape); 
- New provisions concerning alimony payments, so that payments could be 
guaranteed for the couple’s children until they reach the age of majority or till they 
stop going to school. For girls the pension will be paid after her age of majority or if 
they don’t have any revenues, until they get married; 
- The mother’s obligatory consent of the mother for the minor child; 
- The right for the married daughter who is not a major to manage her life (private live 
and business); 
- The right for minor daughters to manage their private as well as their public lives. 
 
Besides, the amendments also dealt with the Code of citizenship, the Penal code and 
the Code of Labour. Now, Tunisian mothers were given the right to transfer nationality to 
their children to the same extent as their husbands, even if they were married to a foreigner, 
on the sole condition that the father has given his approval. The Tunisian woman was the 
only one in the Arab world to be entitled to such a right. It was not until July 2005 that the 
Moroccan woman was granted the same right. The murder of his adulterous wife no longer 
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gave the husband extenuating circumstances. Provisions also reinforced the protection of 
women in regard to men in repressing spousal violence.  
Yet, despite the various measures announced by Ben Ali, nothing was said about 
some fundamental issues such as the marriage of a Tunisian woman to a non-Tunisian man or 
inheritance equality between the sexes, which been raised by women’s organizations.  
 
A Precarious Status 
Though the status is now over 50-years old and deeply rooted in the Tunisian society 
and in Tunisian women’s every day lives, it is threatened from every single political change. 
Feminists as well as quite a few non-feminist women were afraid of losing their status and 
expressed themselves both in the streets and in national media. Bourguiba’s destitution and 
Ben Ali’s coming to power was a period of uncertainty. When Ben Ali took over, the country 
was going through a social and economic crisis that was compounded by the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism. Islamists threatened both State stability as well as the safety of its citizens. 
Women’s acquired rights were clearly in jeopardy. Fundamentalists whose rise had started in 
the 70s launched a blunt attack on the PSC.  The MTI
4
  (Islamic tendency movement), born 
in mosques and Islamic circles, fostered cells of militant women. Those veiled women were 
asked to islamize their fellow sisters. They built aid networks and manage to enter all social 
spheres. Most of these women were activists but non-leaders of the movement.  
They, in fact, represented the basis. They were not against the whole rights accorded to 
women but they advocated a return to the religion. Furthermore, they demanded laws that 
respect the role and position of women in Islam. 
Indeed, the number of veiled women and the number of Khouangia
5
 did not stop 
rising. They were organized into small groups so as to better help people but also to teach 
religious education to other women.    
As protest movements were growing together with cultural identity claims, 
exacerbated by the Gulf war, Bourguiba’s deposition revived the debate on Arab Muslim 
authenticity. It focused on the PSC and it was seen as direct threats to the legal gains granted 
by Bourguiba, the “Father of the nation” and “Liberator of Tunisian women”. “The Personal 
Status Code is not part of the sacred texts”, said a Member of Parliament. “It infringes on 
Islamic texts” added the Mufti of the Republic. Petitions and counter petitions followed one 
another: for the reinforcement of Islam, for the separation of religion and state … Women 
closed ranks. Eventually, the State decided the PCS was outside the field of negotiations and 
the Government struck Islamism harshly (…). Women were summoned to the rescue of the 
government’s policy and its achievements “al-injazat” (Ben Achour, 2001). 
Women’s associations played an important part when they tried to mobilize 
associations, unions and political parties. The 1988 national covenant and the 1989 elections 
indirectly put an end to that controversy. According to the writings of several journalists of 
newspapers politically committed as Achaab or Attariq Al Jadid, and association leaders 
(Tunisian Association of Democratic Women
6
) , for the people in power, any kind of 
dialogue with fundamentalists was out of the question as they were seen as threat to the 
stability of the country. 
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5
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The same fears are cropping up today in Tunisia after the 2011 January revolution 
which led to the fall of Ben Ali’s regime and the constitution of a transitional government 
before and after the election to the Constituent Assembly in October 2011. The political 
change at the head of the State has also lead to the recognition of several new political 
parties, but also to the recognition of parties that were banned when Ben Ali was in power. 
Among those parties, was Ennahdha, which was considered dangerous during the 1990s. The 
rise in the number of veiled women (burqa-wearing women were actually seen in the street, 
unlike other arab countries, a first in Tunisia) and Rached Ghannouchi’s propaganda has 
aroused considerable fears among liberal women. Indeed they believe that their rights granted 
by the PCS could well be in jeopardy either by reaction against the association of women's 
rights to the old regime or by rooting Ennahdha dogmas in the population. Whatever the 
reasons of those fears, they have been expressed on traditional media that have become free 
than they used to be. They also invaded the Internet which has become an alternative space 
built by and for citizens. The Internet has supported women’s mobilization and the defense of 
women’s rights. This new kind of mobilization as well as the use of social networks will be 
analyzed in the forthcoming part.  
 
Women in The Streets, Women On Social Networks 
A lot of publications have underlined the important role played by traditional media in 
the shaping of public opinion and in the support of collective actions (Habermas, 1978; 
Tarrow, 1998). With the development of Information technology (ICT), Tunisian people have 
understood how important these new tools are for the constitution of a platform for political 
expression and for “the construction of identities and for the mobilizing necessary for 
collective actions geared to public opinion” (Chambat, 2000). On the one hand, activists or 
associations find it very hard to have access to the professional press or audiovisual media; 
on the other hand, activists have become aware that the internet can bring them visibility and 
easy access at a very low price while being autonomous vis-à-vis traditional media. In that 
respect, Facebook, the social network, became a very visible space for women’s movements. 
They could thus to share their reflections and make their actions known after Ben Ali’s fall. 
The recent political upheaval in Tunisia has indeed allowed ICT to appear in the 
limelight.  In a country where heavy internet filtering was the rule and press censorship 
rampant, the convergence of traditional ICT and mobile IT, together with the development of 
Facebook and Twitter, the importance of blogging, played an important part in the 
mobilisation that caused the fall of Ben Ali’s regime.  It obviously does not mean that the 
Tunisian revolution can be reduced to a digital revolution. The revolution is not just virtual. 
The battle was won on the streets. But ICT played a major part in Tunisia as well as abroad. 
Wikileaks, Youtube and Twitter have allowed the world to know about the situation, blogs 
have help to support the insurrection whereas the revolution itself was made possible thanks 
to word of mouth –the buzz-, text messaging or Facebook (Liénard & Zlitni, 2012).  
During the whole process that lead to President Ben Ali’s fall on January 14th 2011, 
women participated in all the stages of the Tunisian revolution. They were very active in the 
unions, they were there during marches and demonstrations, and their activism was relentless 
on the Internet. Several Tunisian women ran blogs. A Tunisian girl
7
 run by Linda Ben 
Mhenni is a case in point. She braved the dangers to cover the bloody conflict in Western 
Tunisia. She has actually been awarded the Deutsche Welle International Blog Award and El 
Mundo’s International Journalism Prize in 2011.  
We are going to try and study the various types of collective actions led by Tunisian 
feminists on Facebook, the social network. We opted for that particular tool as it is the most 
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commonly used one in Tunisia with more that 2.5 million accounts in September 2011
8
, well 
ahead of blogs or Twitter. Most facebookers are young, between 18 and 34. They account for 
77% of all accounts. Women represent 41.5% of all accounts
9
. 
In order to constitute the documentary corpus, we monitored the accounts of five 
informers. For this presentation we monitored the data which was then archived between 
January 20





ICT and New Forms of Activism 
Compared with traditional activism (commitment to a structured permanent 
organization whose opinions are expressed by spokesmen), social networks, and generally 
speaking the Internet, reinforce the idea of a “fragmentation of the we”, raised by Jacques Ion 
(1997), in favor of a form of individualized activism.  The Internet user can now participate 
in a “militant” action without having to lastingly adhere to the movement. This can be seen as 
“post-it” activism that can be dropped and terminated at any time (Ion 1997, p.81) since the 
Internet user can leave scotch free. The same way he got in, actually. 
Besides, this on-line activism shows some features that are characteristic of the tool 
used. Activism on Facebook is different from that on other websites or blogs. Indeed, looking 
for a militant website or blog remains a voluntary action (Ollitraut, 1999). Prerequisites are 
necessary for such research: in the case of women’s activism, she/he must have ideological 
predispositions (punctual however they may be); he/she must be, if not savvy, at least 
sufficiently informed about women’s issues and women’s organizations to be able to access 
the right websites. There’s virtually no constraint with Facebook. Thanks to the hyperlinks 
posted by “amateur activists”, the other facebookers issues. As only have to click to access 
the sites, blogs and other Facebook pages devoted to women’s a net surfer wrote on Nawaat10 
(a blog): “First, I am Tunisian and I have decided to break the silence and write on this blog 
which I have discovered through Facebook”. Thus the research and source selection phases 
are done by a link (a person) of the network, who can then broadcast the sources to the other 
members of the network. They, in turn, can access them and relay them to their 
contacts/friends (figure 1). 
 
                                                        
8
 Source: Check Facebook, htpp:/www.checkfacebook.com (on September 24
th
, 2011) 
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Figure 1 : Organization of activism according to a reticular networking model 
 
Post-it activism, however amateurish as it may be, is not deprived of any 
commitment. In fact, it generates various levels of commitment. It can go beyond the mere 
reading of the summary/comment that goes with the link. It may indeed lead the recipient to 
read the document starting at the source; he/she can even fill out a questionnaire or sign a 
petition. At each step, the Internet user has gone another step further in his/her commitment 
to the cause.  
Besides, Facebook has not only revolutionized activists’ different forms of 
commitment, it has also revolutionized the relationship to organizational structures. Indeed, it 
has allowed structured groups as well as unorganized groups to become visible. Several 
Tunisian women’s movements got started on Facebook the day Islamist parties running for 
the Constituent Assembly started challenging their legal rights and the PSC. When preparing 
this communication, we listed over one hundred pages or groups
11
 devoted to that issue, 
twenty or so of which with over 1,000 members or fans. Save two institutional sites that were 
clearly identified as feminist groups, the other groups were without any affiliation at all; they 
did not belong to any political party or any association. They just felt concerned by the 
defense of the Tunisian woman’s status like Vive la Femme Tunisienne, which states on its 
front page that: “it belongs to no political group, no religious organization, […] and it has 
only one claim: full equality”12 or Tunisian Women’s league to defend Woman’s freedom 
(translated from Arabic), which, in its front page, notifies the reader “that their page has 
nothing to do with any organization or association. The space is only a Facebook page 
devoted to discussions about women’s freedom in Tunisia”13 (translated from Arabic). 
Some pages have a clearly feminist editorial line like OUI à la protection des droits 
de la femme Tunisienne
14
 or Pour plus de liberté en faveur de la femme tunisienne, which 
claims that “the aim of the page is to preserve what had been gained through the PSC and 
other decisions in terms of women’s rights against obscurantist movements and reactionary 
discourse that threaten our rights”15. Others are devoted to more general topics with various 
types of posts like Femme Actuelle & tunisienne which defines itself as a “page totally 
devoted to the modern Tunisian wife, to her pleasures and her wishes…”16 or Tous contre les 
intégristes en Tunisie!!!
17
  which urges the State to protest against fundamentalists. 
Others still define themselves as community and activist groups like Forum Des 
Femmes Tunisiennes
18
 which claims to be “an association that gathers independent women, 
regardless of their political credos, and which works for the defense of the gains achieved by 
Tunisian women”, or Le Mouvement Féministe Tunisien19. These activist pages do not exist 
outside their presence on Facebook. Facebook is a tool that allows them to avoid the 
constraints of a time-consuming and costly organization, but helps them to get high visibility 
thanks to this kind of social network. 
Insitutional women’s associations have also their Facebook pages but their pages only 
supplement other communication tools. A case in point is the Association Tunisienne des 
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Femmes Démocrates
20
 (AFTD) or the Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la 
Recherche et le Développement
21
 (AFTURD): they have their own web sites as well as 
printed publications and they are part of the professional press (press releases, meetings, 
conferences, seminars…). However our study shows that these two institutional pages have a 
small fan base (1,094 for AFTD and 3 for AFTURD) compared with 12,589 fans for Vive la 
Femme Tunisienne or 2,456 for Tounsia Horra
22
. This definitely shows that fans do not have 
a long-lasting action in mind when they register. In that particular case, it was very punctual 
and linked to the fact that Islamists were running for election. These amateur activists, 
independent from institutions, rely on networks they have built themselves and they espouse 
a particular cause for a limited period (Flichy, 2010). 
Thus, the public space of institutional activists is being challenged by that of amateur 
activists who then appear as an alternative space, as Internet users say, free from “the usual 
cant” where discourse is both reactive and proactive.  
 
Facebook: a media for women’s mobilization and action 
Facebook has allowed the creation of a network of individuals who mobilized to take 
part in various demonstrations. The network helped for specific actions linked to particular 
events. Indeed, a call to demonstrate coming from a group of activists, or even from one 
activist, can strike a chord with other individuals or other groups. Engaging in protest actions 
is clearly stated on several Facebook pages.  For instance the one posted on the page 
Preserver les acquis de la femme tunisienne dans la nouvelle démocratie (“Preserve 
Tunisian women’s legal gains in the new democracy”) says: “the goal is to fight for the 
preservation of our status in civil society, to exchange ideas and information that can help 
understand how the new democracy works, and to stay united to defend our interests against 
some movements that can be harmful to our rights. Actions may follow.”23 
Given that the success of a call to demonstrate depends, among other things, on the 
number of demonstrators, Facebook seems to be a very effective means to mobilize since it 
allows the quick spread of information.  As an example, in a reaction to a rally organized by 
Islamists, feminists called for a demonstration on Facebook on Saturday February 19
th
, 2011 
in front of the Tunis municipal theatre. That call had circulated on Facebook alone and 
gathered over 2,000 people who marched down Habib Bourguiba Avenue. Similar 
demonstrations were organized via that social network in Tunisia. For Woman’s Day, a 
special page was created on Facebook (Large gathering for Woman’s Day) inviting Tunisians 
to join the gathering on March 8
th, 2011 “to pay homage to Tunisian women who fight to 
preserve their legal rights!” Thus Facebook is an answer to the expectations of people who 
share the same interest without belonging to an institutional organization. That kind of page 
is not only a catalyst for the mobilization of individuals; it is also a way to broadcast the 
demonstration and to comment on it as it happens thanks to photos, videos and publications.  
Now, supporting a cause  does not mean a long-lasting commitment within stable institutions 
–that are seen by Facebookers are remote from action- but rather taking in part in 
demonstrations. Thus, with the Tunisian example, the contention that recruiting organized 
groups of activists is a necessity is not supported by today’s evidence. Indeed, it is through 
Facebook that more or less isolated individuals were urged to join action (Oberschall, 1973). 
It is easy to remark that the production of online information is richer, more documented, 
more illustrated and more polemical than that produced by the professional press (Cardon & 
Granjon, 2003).  
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As a pluralistic tool, Facebook has allowed feminist activists to create an educative 
space. Beyond ideological discourses made to mobilize, several photos and documentary 
films with educative aims were broadcast with the idea of raising awareness. A three-part 
audiovisual document entitled Bourguiba and Women in Tunisia (image 3) shows women’s 
emancipation at the end of the 50s and President Bourguiba taking the veil off women who 
were walking up to him. Another example is a video film La femme tunisienne, un patrimoine 
national (The Tunisian woman, a national heritage) that retraces Tawhida Ben Cheik’s 
school years (image 4). She was the first Muslim girl to pass the baccalauréat in Tunisia 
(1928) and the first woman in the Muslim Arab world to be a doctor, a pediatrician, then a 
gynecologist.  In the same way, photos showing Tunisian women of today and yesterday are 
also used to defend the woman’s cause, such as the photos of Miss Tunisia’s elections of 
1956 with contenders wearing bathing suits (image 5), or that of Ons Jabeur, winner of the 
Roland-Garros tennis junior tournament in 2011 (image 6) or the silver medalist of Track and 







Image 3 : Bourguiba and 
Women in Tunisia 
Image 4 : The Tunisian 
woman, a national 
heritage 
Image 5 : Miss Tunisia’s 
election, 1956 
Image 6 : Habiba 
Ghribi in Daegu, 
2011. 
 
Those photos and videos are meant to be the media supporting the women’s cause so 
as to draw public attention and to keep people on their toes, thus making sure that support is 
there as can be witnessed by the various comments: “very instructive”, “when we consider 
that heritage, we can’t go backward …”, “Thank you for making me feel Tunisian again”, or 
“Thank you for posting this testimony that set into relief the gap between the Tunisian society 
and the societies of other Arab countries. Let’s be faithful to Tunisia!”. The media target 
autonomous Tunisian citizens so they can form their own opinion and become the grassroots 
support of the movement. 
The work done on the social networks by Tunisian people, either as groups made of 
individuals or as structured groups of individuals, have allowed the creation of a space that 
reaches far beyond the national borders. Transnational pages, such as the page “Pour les 
droits de la femme nord-africaine”, joined the national Facebook pages devoted to women. 
More, documents about women fighting for their rights are used to make public opinion 
aware. A case in point is the Iran 8 mars 1979 – Femmes contre hejab report relating Iranian 
women’s protests when wearing the veil was made compulsory or the Women2drive 
operation when Saudi women decided to get behind the wheel in response to calls for 
nationwide action to break a traditional ban. Another good example is the showing of extracts 
of Persepolis on Facebook to make public opinion aware of what could happen in Tunisia if 
Fundamentalists were in power, just like what happened in Iran after the Islamic revolution.  
Beyond photos, videos and consciousness-raising texts, various testimonies are posted 
on Facebook walls to be used as evidence against Islamic parties. These testimonies from 
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expressive experiences that are in sharp contrast with organizations’ instrumental logic 
(Dubet, 1993). 
So as to thwart the Islamic discourse, cyber activists resort to playful and funny ways 
of communicating. Thus when Rachel Ghannoudi came back to Tunisia, Tunisian feminists 
produced some tongue-in-cheek pages like Toutes les Tunisiennes en bikini pour accueillir 
Ghannouchi à l’aéroport24  (All Tunisian women in bikini to welcome home Ghannouchi at 
the airport) to tell him firmly that they will not back down when it comes to fighting for their 
liberties. . No women went to meet the Ennahdha leader in bikini, but that allowed women’s 
activists to have international visibility since the event created a buzz and the information 
appeared on several sites and blogs as well as in the professional press. The name of another 
page is also humorous: Sauvez notre pays des Ninja warriors (Save our country from Ninja 
warriors) and declares in the description of the site: “AGAINST THE BURKA! P.s. Our 
group is not islamophobic, fascist, not even anti-Semitic! Useless to say that we are interested 
in ideology or doctrine and not in the people who have been more often than not misled by 
extremist ideas!”25. The offbeat title and the use of caricatures as means of mobilization have 
helped the page to gather 9,488 fans. 
In order to mobilize public opinion about a possible challenge to the PCS by Islamic 
parties, women activists have produced numerous artistic creations. Several caricatures 
denouncing the wearing of the niqab or the burqa, can be found. For instance, the “surprise 
burqa” (image 7) with a reference to Kinder surprise, the ID card with the photo of a woman 
wearing a niqab with the following information: first name and name “So and so, daughter of 
…, third wife of …., born in Tunistan (image 8) or the cover of a women’s magazine with the 
photo of a woman wearing a niqab and the various topics that are dealt with, such as “Tested 
for you. Lapidation: 5 stones put to the test”, “14 yars-old … and not married yet! A 
worrying phenomenon” or “19 tips to become his favorite wife” (image 9). These caricatures, 
which we can describe as lampoons can be shocking for some (“they are aggressive and 
violent” said an Internet user), but, at least, they arouse debate and stimulate discussion. A 
facebooker commenting the reactions after watching a caricature wrote: ”walah bravoo, 
nikach ta7foun ekhtilef raey ma3koul w klem mo7tarem rabbi yberek fikom walah 
bravooooooo” (Bravo, good discussion, good contradictory debate and respectful discussion; 
God bless you, bravo). 
 
 
   
Image 7 Image 8 Image 9 Image 10 
 
Other productions use comparisons or similitudes between two situations. For 
example, an image is composed of two images: one showing former president Bourguiba 
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taking the veil off a woman’s face in 1956, another one showing Ennahdha leader talking 
with women wearing a niqba in 2011 (image 10). Another image shows the similitude 
between some Ku Klux Klan people and a group of women wearing a burqa. 
Another type of poster shows parodies of a national campaign done by ISIE (Instance 
Supérieure Indépendante pour les Elections) with the slogan “I am registering. What about 
you?” (image 11). The posters have been parodied to raise awareness with, for instance, the 
photo of a woman wearing a niqab with the slogan “She registered. It’s high time for you to 
register” (image 12). The aim of this parody, according to some Internet users is to urge 
people to think and then register on electoral roles so as to be heard. 
 
  
Image 11 : poster of the national campaign done by 
ISIE 
Image 12 : parodie of the campain 
 
 
Facebook has become the space that gives the possibility for everyone to express 
themselves. It allows all kinds of contributions since it tolerates different formats and 
different writings. Photos without captions but with comments can be found together with 
mini clips that just last a few seconds, video that can be a few minutes long, short and long 
texts where the author is really committed but capable of being critical, institutional texts and 
personal testimonies. Besides, the language used is familiar or colloquial, yet it can also be 
formal. Texts can also be in Tunisian, Arabic, French or English. As to the contents, variety 
of enunciation is the rule: annotated articles, insults, rants, a space for a debate, opinions that 
generate tons of reactions … when users fall into the “trap of a forum leading to an overspill 
of comments, from factual information to texts where opinions are firmly stated, from 





 2011, the PSC 55
th
 anniversary was celebrated in Tunisia. The 
comeback of the religious parties in the Tunisian public space and the success of Ennahdha at 
the recent Constituent Assembly elections has put it in jeopardy. Under pressure from many 
quarters and from the media, Ennahdha has reassured the Tunisian population and said it 
would not to tinker with the PSC and has even suggested that they could include it in the 
Constitution.  
Facebook, the most widely used virtual platform in Tunisia, has thus become an 
independent alternative space, replacing face-to-face discussions with e-mails,  networks of 
"friends" built by the users themselves. Women activists, supporters or members of 
institutional organizations take advantage of the opportunities offered by social networks to 
enhance public awareness and carry out specific actions, as can be seen with the recent 
demonstration for freedom, on Saturday the 28
th
 of January 2012. 
Since Facebook is a tool that makes the voices of all users heard, it is also used by 
several Islamist movements to thwart feminist movements. Indeed, they either respond to 
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demonstration (demonstration against secularism, April 1
st
, 2011) or even create their own 
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